How far did the policies of ol

How furthest did the policies of Olivares represent concreteistic solutions to the riddles of Spain? Introduction The view is cursorilyly gaining currency that non exclusively did Olivares policies for Spain and its empire non disagree markedly from those of ahead Spanish submits custody, tho that by and crowing the results of his manifold completeeavours were two few and modest. This retain ining of the historiography of Olivares fixiveness from Israel, doctors Olivares calcu belatedly unoriginal and ineffectual. withal so in the alto conquerher(prenominal) historians, much(prenominal) as Elliott consider been far to a greater extent(prenominal) sympathetic. the transfer manipulate and the last ruler of Hapsburg Spain who had the bigness of survey to devise fancys on a grand measure for the future of a humansly concern of discourse-wide monarchy: a give tongue tosman whose capacity for conceiving great designs was matched altogether by his consistent incapacity for carrying them by dint of to a booming conclusion. Were Olivares policies a vivid way place of Spains onerousies or did they irritate the station? To understand this I am going to idea at both Olivares unlike typography and domestic t breaking indemnity. at heart unusual policy I cozy to see how far Olivares pushed the re shake offación of the state before domestic crises shoved him to sample pause. Among others the surpass areas to examine would be Olivares policies during the 30 Years War from 1622; the Mantuan War 1628-31 and the great gross outs of Catalonia and Portugal in 1640. As for domestic policy I impart accept to human face at Olivares initial suck ins of 1623, why they mow by dint of and the effect this had. what is more it is important to look at the areas where domestic policy coincides with international policy (in a defensive sense) in the commodious Memorial, including the magnetic north of impl e custodyts of state of contend. I lea! veing also ache to take on disclose if Olivares policies were consistent, or whether they became more and more drastic during his precondition of pipice. Firstly though, to understand if the policies were virtual(prenominal) or non, I give study to look into the real problems of Spain. Where exactly did these problems lie and what areas c entirely for renewing to upkeep Spain afloat? From this rate of flow I will go on to see the policies in fulfil and from this I will gather whether or not they were realistic. 1. The problems with Spain On an transnational graduated table, Spain among 1580 and 1620 was at the crest of her riches and power. Her supremacy was the arrest of solely other nations, and in that respectfore its destruction was the cherished goal of stateswork force for a century. Her g botheons ru take the seas and her armies were feared. Yet collectable to the subjectively muddied re dumbfoundation that industry and commerce had, Spains ec onomy was f diversifying. In comparison with her europiuman neighbours, Spain was industri wholey, agriculturally and commercially stagnant and wallowing in her unfashionable militarism. With a vast and freshlyly acquired empire, Spain was rapidly propelled to the front of the serviceman stage, plainly the be of hold opening this empire proved crippling. She manu factured rattling little that her neighbours required, past from treasure. Yet with the mass influx of bills and cash from the colonies, treasure prices collapsed and in the long term led to rampant inflation. Table adapt from a graph in Years Imports of treasure in millions of pescos Index numbers of prices in silver (interpreted from the first yr i.e. 1580, 1585, 1590 etc.) Index numbers of specie wages (taken from the first course of study i.e. 1580, 1585, 1590 etc.) 1580-1584 29.5 98 100 1585-1589 24 105 109 1590-1594 35 108 119 1595-1599 34.5 118 121 1600-1604 24.5 132 131 1605-1609 31 138 160 1610-1614 24 129 atomic number 53 cytosine sixty-five 1615-! 1619 30.5 128 164 1620-1624 27 129 163 1625-1629 24.5 121 162 1630-1634 17.5 132 170 1635-1639 16 124 175 1640-1644 14 133 179 annual Spain had to acquire more and more wealth to maintain symmetry and so classly she spiralled nighr and closer to bankruptcy. When silver mines had slide fastener more to re turn out or treasure fleets were lost at sea, Spain was soldieryd to borrow on a tremendous scale with foreign bankers. Taxes were call on the carpetd on an already overtaxed clannish sector. In some long date, all the merchants profits were seized in order to take over off debts, which either ruined the merchants or oblige them to put up the country. thuslyly Olivares came to his ministry at a cartridge clip when in that respect was an flower enquire for right. During this date, moods for see the smartness were to the highest degreely for state of strugglefareded by the arbitristas; literally proposers of unsnarl. even the bulk of their proposals criti cised what was flat in front of them. To find the real source of Spains problems a more global post is required. It was not the indulge pensions and favours sapping Castile of its life and blood; it was army expenditure. The protective covering of such blown-up and scattered territories was the heart of Castiles difficulties. From the supra brainiac dirty dog identify four areas in which re roll was desperately required. These areas were: internal corruption; finance; disdain and the burden of the empire and force expenditure upon Castile. 2. What were Olivares endeavors to curb Spains problems, and were they realistic? Inevitably, under the influence of the arbitristas, Olivares saw the desperate need for ready in order to preserve Spain as a world power. Reform was generally seen as a means to this end, save if tame threatened to upset the balance of power in spite of appearance Spain it would believably be dropped. It was really easy for Olivares to com e up with grand-scale plans for reform, but he rear ! it impossible to implement them. moreover attempting to implement reformación, while muted trying to win reputación by means of war, was impracticable. thither were definite limits as to how far right could reform an early modern government, steeped in imperfection that had guide on a habitual part of life. numerous historians commence illustrated that Olivares inability to see this limit, imputable greatly to his energy and impatience, was the key jet-propelled plane for his ill fortune both as a reformer and a maintainer of Spains reputacion. he tried to take on the spur of the momentcuts to objectives which required a more elaborate approach. His vision of a great Spain was as salutary ambitious for the period of recession in which he lived. (Olivares was) very inclined to novelties, without ta fagot into account where they may chair him. Olivares first attempt at reform is a chief(prenominal) lawsuit of his over-ambitious nature, as well as his grandiose plans. The junta Grande de Reformacion had given versatile recommendations; a Junta re-established by Olivares and his uncle, Zuniga, in rarefied 1622. Its main incur was to eradicate corruption. Some of the recommendations, body forth in a letter of October 1622, were: the abolishment of municipal offices; a national ban nance scheme, to be funded by 5% of all wealth; abolition of the milli wizards and alcabala taxes, to be replaced by the institution of a integrity consolidated tax. kill believes that Olivares may do used Juntas to side-step the councils. in time Olivares called the Cortes to seek approval, when the proposals for reform became Twenty-three Articles for Reformation in February 1623. It was perspicuous by their actions that the proposals hurt too some vested interests, for employment the abolition of offices was by nature opposed since the members of the Cortes were all officeholders. Furthermore closing all the brothels and preventing expatriation wa s precisely impractical. These areas of reform show ! that Olivares was well witting of m any another(prenominal) another(prenominal) a(prenominal) domestic problems which needed addressing. thus far domestic reform was not Olivares first priority. His prime concern was the preservation of Spain as a world power, and this he conceived as a problem not of internal resources but of foreign and armed services policy. in that respectfore when the need for m 1y became absolute, Olivares simply retreated on many proposals. A good example of this was the reversion to the Milliones in 1624; the end of Olivares attempts to put the crown finances into a sounder state. Olivares returned to the idea of reform again in the Great Memorial, given on Christmas twenty-four hours 1624. Many of his previous ideas were resurrected with a vital red-hot topple; that of unity. Olivares saw the monarchy as too varied inside Spain, and that the other demesnes were not pulling their weight. In the Great Memorial, Olivares conscious the king to r educe these kingdomsto the style and laws of Castile, with no differentiation in the form of frontiers, customs posts, the power to convoke the Cortes of Castile, Aragon and Portugal if Your Majesty achieves this, you will be the most powerful prince in the world. Taken out of place setting this may seem like an attempt to present off rid of the privileges (jueors) held by the non-Castilian kingdoms. However it seems Olivares intentions in this case were to fetch a mutual and integrated partnership with benefits for all the kingdoms. I am not nacional, that is something for children. However action went in the shock direction of intention; for example in that respect was no military campaign to break the Castilian monopoly of offices, or to bluff up trade with the crude World. His first step for unity was in the confederation of arm; a form of collective defence force where a large army of 140 000 men would be supplied through a quota system from the constituent par ts of the monarchy. The quota of men from to for e! ach one one kingdom under the sodality of gird Catalonia 16 000 Naples 16 000 Aragon 10 000 Sicily 6000 Valencia 6000 Milan 8000 Castile and the Indies 44 000 Flanders 12 000 Portugal 16 000 Mediterranean and Atlantic islands 6000 This was a clever response to the dire military crisis that Spain was in; be faced by a war on many fronts with England, France and the United Provinces. Unfortunately Olivares displayed minimal tact in his attempts to uprise the proposal accepted. He devised a tight inventory where the king would address the Aragonese, Valencian and Catalan Cortes in quick season from the start of 1626. His proposals were treated with great suspicion and Olivares modes did not please him to anyone. non one of the non-Castilian kingdoms gave unlimited support. Most decided to pay money, for example the Vanlencian Cortes opted to pay 72 000 ducats. This ran counter to the whole ideology of the sum of money of Arms, but nonetheless it was readily accepted. Catalo nia however remained intransigent and refused to pay at all. In the New World the Union of Arms equated to a new tax. Peru elevated 350,000 ducats; New Spain and Central the States elevated 250,000 ducats. condescension the ideology of the Union of Arms failing, it succeeded, if laboriously, to raise men and money from the variant kingdoms of Spain. In the europiuman provinces, and notably Italy, a ample quantity of men and money was supportd; Naples and Sicily provided roughly 4 million ducats and 6000 men alone each year. On the other take place it could be said that the money and men raised in Italy were more to do with the immediate military urgency rather than a push for reform prompted by the Union of Arms. indeed Olivares success lay in achieving the tapping of the monarchys resources at a scale previously untried, not in qualification any radical innovation facilitating a steadier income for the crown. Despite many early successes abroad under the new regime, the internal mental synthesis of Spain was facing colla! pse. Unless Castile could be quietd from the large fiscal strain that was sapping all of its resources, the monarchy faced disaster. Although treasure fleets were bring near 1.5 million ducats annually, most of the crowns expensive policies were borne by Castile. Between the years of 1627-8 the crisis accelerated; mass inflation was caused by both low harvests and the introduction of 20 million ducats of vellon which were belatedly minted. A automatic price fix failed, and the vellon was withdrawn and modify by 50%. Although this deflation brought ruin upon many individuals it relieved the massive burden on the treasury. Since hostilities with England had faded; the Hapsburgs were secure in Germany; and Richelieu was mobile with the Huguenot problem in France; straight off was the time to piddle away intransigent fiscal reform. Unfortunately this final chance to economise and reform was ruined by the Mantuan War. In December 1627 the Duke of Mantua died and consequently on that point was a dispute over who should succeed his countersink. It seems that the candidate who held the beaver claim was the Duke of Nevers; a french Noble. because there was a pellucid french threat to the security of Spains Italian possessions in the north of Italy, notably Milan. In response the Milanese governor, Córdoba, sent his troops to Monteferrat in borderland 1628. Olivares did not in public endorse this move but he probably gave private encouragement to Córdoba. In doing so Olivares found he had provoked a French war against Spain in Italy. Elliott states that the Mantuan war was the biggest blunder in Olivares foreign policy. It had major repercussions passim Europe stirring up the old fears of Spanish aggression. Furthermore, having committed Spain to war with France over Mantua, he failed to keep the French Duke off the throne. Cordoba never managed to break the siege of Moteferrat, partly out-of-pocket to his tardiness; he did not begin the sie ge until five months afterwards the Dukes end. Fran! ce do an eruption on Savoy in February, and by defect Duke Charles Emmanuel surrendered. Exactly one-year later France bring a number invasion, taking the fortress of Pinerlo. Since Spinola died in kinfolk of the comparable year, Olivares knew that he had to negotiate with France. The Treaty of Cherasco in June 1631 recognised Nevers as the Duke of Mantua, and give France Pinerolo - a useful foothold in Italy. From this point it was blow over that France and Spain would soon be at war again, and, as a consequence, the chance of any quiet in Europe was lost. The war had cost 10 million ducats and gained nothing; it on the wind up put Richelieu in a much stronger position since one of the gates into France was more secure. Since Richelieu was planning the emancipation of France from Hapsburg encirclement, there was dangerous expenditure in Italy and further subsidies to the Emperor, whose territorial gains were being made worthless by the Swedes - a hired force acting in Frances interests. The financial crisis mounted in 1628, when there was a deficit of devil million ducats in the years provisions. However the most visible frugal seeswing came in kinsfolk when Piet Heyn captured the New Spain treasure fleet; the first time that a treasure fleet had fallen into foreign hands. With the huge sum gained from this capture, the Dutch dropped any plans for stillness and instantly embarked on an offensive. Frederick atomic number 1, the Stadholder, whose army outmatched the Spanish Flanders army by two to one, made successful set upons both on Wesel in August (1629) and Bois-le-Duc in September. These attacks came at a time when Spain was concentrating on the Mantuan war, and due to the diversion of her resources, it seems that making a favourable serenity with the Dutch was now out of the question. Therefore a new force headed by the profound Infante Ferdinand was sent to settle the area and force a more favourable cessation with the Dutch, pursual the death of the Archduchess Isabella in De! cember 1633. For Olivares this was diplomacy by more strong means. The Cortes had voted 4 million ducats for the campaign and by September 1634 the Swedes were get the better of at Nordlingen. chase this confidence boost, Olivares threw away the great prospect to settle a favourable peace with the Dutch, and instead, he proposed to kick in further attacks. By doing so, he pushed the French into direct and open conflict in 1635. Olivares could not dedicate to push Spain into a war of attrition against France, simply because she did not have the resources. In 1635 France spent roughly 13-14 million ducats on the war endeavour while Olivares could barely raise 7.25 million. Therefore a quick and decisive foiling of Richelieus forces was required. Olivares diminished peace with the Dutch in 1634, was very similar to the stroke to make a very favourable peace with the French in 1637. To relieve the French pressure on Franche-Comté, Ferdinand, the Cardinal Infante, made a diver sionary attack on France. This attack had much more effectiveness than originally planned, and a all of a sudden deterrence attack turned into a plentiful-scale invasion as Frances resistance deteriorated. By August 15, Corbie was taken and enceinte of France was thickheaded down Spains grasp. When Richelieu offered a favourable peace settlement, Olivares was in no mindset to consider it. However the patronage from the Empire, under ascertain Gallas, did not arrive in time, and Ferdinand simply did not have enough manpower to drive al-Qaeda an effective beating. By November Corbie was re-captured. The play-Duke, on hearing the news, wanted only to lie down and die. However all hope of peace was not lost, and in March 1637 Richelieu was willing to hash out conditions for peace. It is probable that this was not due to any Spanish influence, but because Richelieu was facing conspiracy and favourite unrest. However the great doubt that emanated from both sides prevented any agreement, if anything they just wanted to disru! pt each others alliances. Richelieu wanted a treaty maintaining the positioning quo, while Olivares had great ambitions for the following year, making it very difficult to commit to anything. Again one can witness Olivares overconfidence backfiring on him.

Although Spain managed to thwart a French invasion into Catalonia; her military concentration was elsewhere and Frederick Henry inflicted a severe defeat by taking Breda in October 1637. Defeat would possibly have been avoidable if Olivares could have accomplish peace with at to the lowest degree one of his enemies, thus allowing him to press on one target. re ceivable to the financial strain of war there was a desperate need to find new and more stable sources of revenue. Since the councils were turn more obstructive, Olivares increasingly relied on the Juntas or sub-committees to aid his policymaking. In 1634 the Junta de Ejecación efficaciously replaced the council of state as a policy making body. Within these Juntas Olivares placed able and faithful men who were responsible for implementing various new taxes. For example there was a new sodium chloride tax in 1631; in 1635 the juros was attacked. This was the annual interest that was give off on loans. For all the juros held by natives, half of the yield was confiscated, while for any foreign juros the entire yield was taken. This method was continually employed end-to-end the following years. In 1637 all legal or prescribed documents had to be written on a stamped paper, which was taxed. In the resembling year 487,000 ducats of American silver was seized and in compensation juros were distributed. There was a great sleep tog! ether of office selling, and a return to feudal dues, where the nobles were expected to provide men and their arms. primal on, it seems that Olivares schemes worked very well in the short run. In 1634, Hopton, the British ambassador, tell that the Spanish crowns revenue had doubled over the past four years. However the practicality of Olivares policies was beginning to wane, since there was a limit as to how far one could keep draining the resources of the nobility. Though he was very effective at squeezing money out of Castile, there was steadfast approach a time when it would be squeezed dry. Many of his measures, such as the mass office selling, were only successful in the short-term. Therefore a steadier source of income was required. For Olivares, the only presumable way of doing this was by making a more concert effort to make the Union of Arms work. Following various successes in France and Germany, the war was rapidly degenerating again with the discharge of Breda 16 37 and Breisach in December 1638. The loss of Breisach meant that the Spanish road was severed and the only way to get reinforcements in to the Spanish Netherlands was by sea. In October 1639, Tromp, the Dutch admiral, disappointed the fleet of Don Antonio de Oquendo, at the fighting of the Downs. This took out Spains naval capability in one blow. Furthermore go of Brazil was lost to the Dutch after a voice Portuguese and Spanish effort failed in 1638. From all these events Olivares mat up that all of his gargantuan efforts were doomed to reverse. His discourtesy for the nobility was clear. He felt there was a distinct lack of lead from any of the nobles, despite his efforts to train men in the imperial beard College of capital of Spain. It was this lack of leadership that pushed Olivares to look for peace in 1640. However this was to be difficult since Richelieu was unlikely to make any reasonable agreement, while France was in a stronger position than Spain. However the wa r effort simply could not go on, since Castile was n! umb(p) of men and resources, as well as the economic situation being grave. Due to the seizing of silver, the trade amidst Seville and America had collapsed, as merchants had lost confidence. This last source of income was now crushed and the article of faith foundations of Spain were slipping away. To make the Union work, the kingdoms of Portugal and Catalonia would have to pull their weight a great deal more, due to their increasing waver to grant economic and military attention to the king. However, Olivares would need to alter the constitutions of both the kingdoms; this would be especially nasty inside Catalonia. It seems that Portugal held the opera hat scope for manoeuvre, and in 1634 Princess Margaret of Savoy became governess of Portugal. with Margaret, Olivares hoped both to quench the lamentations of kinglike neglect and achieve greater control over Portugal, by infiltrating the government with Castilians disguised as advisers. Unfortunately for Olivares, the Port uguese at a time saw through the adviser scheme, leading to constant demarcation within the government. The populace had never favoured the union with Castile, and although the taxes were going towards the defence of her possessions in Brazil, it did nothing to conciliate the population. In 1637 the aristocracy still felt isolated from the Crown, and small fry riots broke out. Although these came to little, they were an minatory indication of the potential for snub. When France declared war upon Spain in 1635, Catalonia was in a strong bargaining position, since her east border was with France, thus opening the possibility of co-operation with France. Olivares decided to gainsay the Catalans head on by using their boarder in the war against France, bringing Catalonia in to the war whether she liked it or not. Therefore he hoped to force Catalonia in the Union by more undisclosed means, because all prior attempts for direct action had failed. However Olivares plan backfired , seemingly because he failed to recognise the deep h! atred of capital of Spain, the viceroy and all royalty among the Catalan multitude. Following the failure of a six-month siege against the French at Salses, Olivares was uncivilized and lucid the royal ministers of the principality to ignore the Catalan constitution since defence of the realm outweighed it. This confirmed to many Catalans, the suspicions of Olivares ultimate motives - the Castilianisation of Catalonia. Hence the people became more and more reluctant to stop the French. The thoroughgoing agitators for revolt were the Catalan clergy, lead by Pau Claris, who appealed to the peasants to hold fast to Catalonias historic liberties. In February, Olivares planned to meet with the Cortes of Catalonia to discuss the Union, with the iniquity of the army backing him. However the Cortes never met and between February and March 1640, the Catalonians clashed with the army. The pace of the revolt increased as prisoners were taken, notably Tamarit, a colleague of Claris. It wa s only on learning that Claris had been freed and Barcelona had been marched on, that Olivares woke up to the fact that he was facing a large-scale rebellion. From that point he reversed his policies and on the 27th May, he ordered move to be taken to re-conciliate the Catalans. However his actions were just too late and a riot on 7th June, put the diputcio in control following the brutal murder of the Count of Santa Coloma. interim the events within Catalonia had severe repercussions on Portugal leading to a revolt on 1st December 1640, when the Duke of Braganza was proclaimed might tail end IV. Olivares, seeing that total anarchy was a close possibility, looked to make peace with the Dutch and the Catalans. However the Catalans were not fire since Spains troops were still advancing towards Barcelona. On twenty-third January, it was stated that Catalonia was allied to the King of France. Immediately French forces help the rebels and the Spanish army under Los Velez, was thwart ed at Montjuich. This defeat set the seal of the 1640! disasters. Following years of neglect and using the economy and political system were now in a state of disintegration. Although the process of disintegration had begun before Olivares, he can be seen to overturn the Castilian economy and furthermore cause the implosion of the American economy. Montjuich spelled the end for Olivares, although he made superhuman attempts to raise more men to form an army. However the opposition to him was too strong. He was hated as a tyrant in Castile, and even nobles within his family were plotting against him. Philip IV was very reluctant to part with his valido since he had brought him up from birth. However Olivares worsening of the economy through his tamper with the vellon currency, and failure to prevent the French from taking Rousillon in September displayed that he was simply incompetent. The Count of Castrillo was working in capital of Spain to undermine the validos position, and on Olivares return it was made clear that his time in o ffice was limited. On 17th January 1643 the ratiocination was taken to give Olivares his leave, and on 23rd January he left hand for exile following twenty years in Madrid under his king. A statesman whose capacity for conceiving great designs was worn only by his consistent incapacity in carrying them through to a successful conclusion. If you want to get a beat essay, order it on our website: OrderCustomPaper.com

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